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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-4015
___________
JANET L. KARNES,
Appellant

v.

*JO ANNE B. BARNHART, THE
COMM ISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c) F.R.A.P.)

___________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-01735)
District Judge: The Honorable Robert J. Cindrich
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 12, 2004

BEFORE: NYGAARD, M cKEE, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

(Filed June 29, 2004)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a claim for supplemental security income (SSI) under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Appellant Janet L. Karnes petitioned the District
Court to overturn the Social Security Commissioner’s final decision denying Karnes SSI
benefits. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the District Court
granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm the District Court’s order.
I. Standard of Review
While we review the District Court’s order de novo, we will only reverse a grant of
summary judgment for the Commissioner if we conclude that the ALJ’s findings are not
supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence” represents evidence ‘a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate’ to support a conclusion. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900,
901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
II. Factual & Procedural Background
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Karnes first applied for disability benefits in 1994. She alleged that neck and back
pain and diminished memory resulting from a 1987 car wreck rendered her unable to
work. Karnes’ application was denied twice before she obtained an administrative
hearing on January 30, 1998. Applying the familiar five-step analysis, the ALJ concluded
that although Karnes’ lingering pain and anxiety limited her capabilities, Karnes was not
disabled under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). Further, the ALJ found that Karnes’ claims were
exaggerated and not credible when compared with other evidence.
Karnes obtained a second hearing before the same ALJ in 2002 because the Social
Security Administration was unable to locate her claim file. Again, the ALJ concluded
that although Karnes suffers from severe impairments, these impairments do not meet or
exceed the limitations listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4; and a significant
number of jobs exist to accommodate her residual functioning capacity. The ALJ again
found Karnes’ testimony not credible.
Karnes then sought relief from the District Court. That Court concluded that
“substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision that Karnes had the residual
capacity to complete modified light work.” Appellant’s Appendix at 30. The Court then
granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and Karnes filed this appeal.
III.
On appeal, Karnes argues that, in light of the whole record, no substantial evidence
exists to support the ALJ’s findings that Karnes can engage in modified light work, and
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that her testimony was not totally credible. After a careful review of the record, we
conclude that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
A.
First, Karnes argues that she does not have the ability to carry out even sedentary
work, much less modified light work. However, as the ALJ pointed out, a substantial
amount of medical evidence contradicts Karnes’ assertions. Medical records spanning
fifteen years of medical treatment consistently suggest that although Karnes may suffer
from residual neck and back pain, she is not totally disabled. For instance, Dr. Gardner,
Karnes’ treating physician from 1987-1991, noted that Karnes retained a full range of
motion in her shoulder and neck and that she could walk normally. In 1997, Dr. Scullin
reported “no objective evidence of ongoing neuropathy” and that Karnes could “perform
sedentary or light activities as long as frequent changes in position were allowed.”
Admin. Rec. at 337. Treating and consulting physicians deemed a 2001 whole body bone
scan “essentially normal.” Admin. Rec. at 462. In 2002, orthopedist Dr. Jerome Bonier
described Karnes’ reflexes, motor skills and gait as normal.
Next, Karnes argues that her anxiety and depression render her unable to work. In
order to be considered disabling, a mental condition must result in at least two of the
following: 1) marked restriction of activities of daily living; 2) marked difficulties in
maintaining social functioning; 3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration,
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persistence or pace; or 4) repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration. 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.06.
The ALJ found that although Karnes was afflicted by anxiety and depression, she
could reasonably control her symptoms through continued use of anxiety medication.
Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Karnes’ impairments were not sufficiently severe to render
her disabled. Karnes contends that the ALJ’s findings contradict her extensive medical
records. However, the nature of the Karnes’ treatment provides substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s findings. For example, Karnes’ own treating psychiatrist, Dr.
Matta, never prescribed anti-depressants to Karnes and reported that Karnes successfully
managed her symptoms while using anxiety medication. Further, the record reveals that
Karnes could dress herself, care for several young children and complete a wide range of
household chores with little functional limitation.
Karnes argues that the ALJ engaged in irresponsible “guess work” in discerning
how much work Karnes could do in a given day. On the contrary, the record indicates the
ALJ took special care to recognize Karnes’ genuine difficulties. For example, the ALJ
concluded that Karnes is indeed limited by severe impairments as a result of neck and
back pain, anxiety and depression. The ALJ also noted that Karnes was unable to return
to her past relevant work and adopted Dr. Bonier’s recommended limitations on the type
of light work that Karnes could do.
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Finally, the ALJ directed several hypothetical questions to an impartial vocational
expert to determine whether Karnes’ impairments would prevent her from finding
suitable work. The ALJ limited potential jobs to those involving one or two-step
instructions, moderate to low stress levels and those that would allow Karnes to alternate
her body position. The vocational expert indicated that approximately 3 million jobs exist
in the national economy that could accommodate Karnes’ limitations.
B.
“[W]here credibility determinations are based on the ALJ’s assessment of
demeanor, those assessments are entitled to great deference as long as relevant factors are
considered and resolutions explained.” Atlantic Limousine, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 243 F.3d
711, 718 (3d Cir. 2001).
In this case, the ALJ pointed to specific discrepancies between Karnes’ assertions
and her medical records. Karnes’ claim of total disability contrasted sharply with Dr.
Scullin’s determination that Karnes suffered no impairment of ambulation and no clinical
signs of atrophy. While Karnes asserted that she suffered from debilitating anxiety and
sleeplessness, her psychiatrist consistently reported that Karnes was managing her
symptoms. Finally, Karnes also complained that she suffers from debilitating depression,
but her own psychiatrist has declined to prescribe her any anti-depressants. Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Karnes lacked total credibility. We will
therefore defer to that finding.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we find that the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s findings. Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District
Court.
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